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Turkey is facing a critical political turning point. The rupture of the Gezi protests 
of May–June 2013 was fol lowed by a spate of corruption allegations against the AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) in December 2013 and the unleashing of a power 
struggle between the AKP and the Fethullah Gülen move ment. The successes of the 
AKP in the local elections of March 2014 and in the vote of August 2014, which saw its 
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, rise to the presidency with a large percentage of the 
vote, were followed by the loss of a parliamentary majority in the national elections 
of June 2015. The failure of the political parties to form a gov ernment after the vote 
meant that the country went through  new elections in November 2015. The AKP won 
the elections with increased majority. These developments are taking place within an 
increasingly troubled domestic context, with the peace process between the govern-
ment and the Kurdish minority collapsing and the ugly spectre of violence and war 
once again haunting the country. Violence and war are also affecting Turkey from the 
south, with the Arab uprisings of 2011 having unleashed turmoil in the Middle East 
region as a whole and particularly in neighbouring Syria.
The current juncture of Turkish history, following 13 years of uninterrupted AKP 
parliamen tary dominance, offers an interesting vantage point from which to ponder 
the question of Turkish democracy. The balance sheet, as always, is a mixed one. The 
political success of the AKP has been impressive: it is rarely that a party has increased 
its majority while in government, as the AKP did in the second and third contests it 
faced, in 2007 and 2011, following the initial victory of 2002. The length and endur-
ance of the AKP’s electoral success have eliminated the need for coalition governments. 
This has offered the country a period of extended political stability which has not 
only allowed the economy to thrive but may also have contributed to the maturation 
and smoother functioning of state institutions and political processes. More intangi-
bly, popular engagement and a sense of participation may possibly turn out to have 
increased the sense of ownership of the political process in wide segments of the Turk-
ish public.
The greater positive contribution to Turkish democracy of the 13 years of AKP gov-
ernment, however, must be that it has broken the Kemalist establishment’s hold on 
power. Whatever our assessment of the values, practices and ideas of any given polit-
ical formation or party, we must agree that democracy requires political pluralism. If 
democracy is seen as the most important value and goal for a polity, then alternation in 
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government is necessary. The AKP has represented a counter-narrative to the Kemal-
ist establishment in Turkey, being, as it is, a party with Islamist roots (though it rejects 
the label of an Islamist party itself). It has also embodied the advent of a political, 
social and economic counter-elite. The defanging of the Turkish military and its being 
dragged down from its pedestal as the guardian of the Turkish state have been the 
main outcome of this alternation. Whatever the true motives behind this development, 
it can only be a positive one, given that in a democracy there must be civilian oversight 
of the army. The same can be said about the opposition to the AKP: it is admittedly in 
a position of weakness currently but when that is overcome, and it reaches the point 
of being able to challenge the AKP, it will have done so on the back of its own efforts 
to convince and mobilise the Turkish public – not with the support of the Kemalist 
establishment or a sense of entitlement.
The other side of the balance sheet, however, is long and growing at an alarming rate. 
If the arrival of a counter-narrative and a counter-elite is a healthy sign, their continu-
ing dominance is beginning to be problematic in itself: to put it simply, the AKP has 
been too powerful for too long for the good of Turkish democracy. There are two issues 
here: majoritarianism and Islamisation. With each year of its being in government, the 
AKP has used the support of the majority of the electorate to disregard the views of 
and indeed trample on the minority. The rule of law, freedom of the press and the 
separation of powers have increasingly suffered, as seen in the Ergenekon trials and 
the witch-hunt against the Fethullah Gülen movement. Turkey is notorious for impris-
oning and persecuting its journalists. The government, particularly in the person of 
prime minister and later president Erdoğan, is emitting a more and more intolerant 
and authoritarian discourse. An additional worrying sign is a creeping Islamisation 
not only of the public sphere but also of social life, education and culture. The areas 
of women, gender and sexuality are of particular concern here. Even in the complex 
sphere of foreign policy, one can observe a sectarian (Sunni) element in operation. With 
regard to the most important problem facing Turkish democracy, namely the Kurdish 
issue, hopes that there would be progress in resolving it were dashed in 2014–15. In 
addition, Turkey remains divided along ideological, as well as ethnic, lines, with the split 
between Kemalists and Islamists – and the suspicion, unease and disquiet it brings with 
it – remaining unbridgeable. This is an obstacle to the smooth running of a democratic 
polity which requires a considerable degree of consensus and cooperation.
The major questions which surround the future of democracy in Turkey are about 
insti tutions and attitudes. The progress achieved over the past few decades, and, 
indeed, over the past few years, in that direction must not be underestimated. How-
ever, the flaws and problems remain profound, and there has been regression in many 
areas. It is clear that institutions are still not sufficiently robust and the toleration of 
difference not sufficiently developed for Turkey to be said to have achieved the status 
of a mature democracy.
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It is to address as many aspects of the above issues as possible that the Middle East 
Centre and the Chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies at LSE organised a panel dis-
cussion and a workshop on the state of democracy in Turkey on 19–20 March 2015. 
The panel addressed the questions of women, popular attitudes towards democracy and 
state–civil society relations. The workshop focused on state institutions and the rule of 
law (the constitution; the judiciary, the legislature and the separation of powers; secu-
rity sector reform); civil society and political culture (the political opposition; minority 
issues; LGBT rights and gender); and the question of democracy in the context of for-
eign relations (the influence of international norms and institutions on legal reform, 
the impact of the EU accession process and the question of the Middle East). We were 
honoured by the attendance of an impressive range of academic participants, although 
unfortunately Professor Talip Küçükcan of Marmara University was unable to attend.
A selection of the papers presented at the panel and workshop is published here, 
under the auspices of the Middle East Centre. They do not represent all our discus-
sions but focus on some of their key aspects. Deniz Kandiyoti’s paper on the gender 
wars in Turkey argues that the politicisation of gender issues is ‘triggered by the fact 
that stirring up moral anxieties over women’s conduct and propriety had become one 
of the key pillars of the AKP’s populist discourse: a discourse that pits a virtuous “us” 
– the real people – against an immoral “them”’. The paper tracks the gains in terms 
of women’s rights in the early years of the AKP and their unravelling in the later 
AKP period. Examining the impact of legal reform and the role of civil society on 
human rights, Emma Sinclair-Webb ‘reflects on how Turkey’s presentation of legis-
lative changes as progress under the scrutiny of the EU, UN and Council of Europe 
helped skew the facts and divert attention from the lack of institutional underpinning 
for reform, the lack of political accountability, judicial independence and oversight 
mechanisms, and other structural factors with implications for a culture of rights’. She 
argues, in a nutshell, that ‘a legalistic approach has substituted for a real commitment 
to reform’. Meltem Müftüler-Baç argues that ‘in 2015, it is possible to witness a differ-
ent outcome: a stalled negotiation process with dim prospects for Turkey’s accession to 
the EU, and a backsliding into authoritarianism in the country’. She tracks the impact 
of political conditionality by the EU on domestic democratic reform in Turkey and its 
unintended consequences. which include majoritarian authoritarianism. Since 2011 
in particular democratic consolidation ‘has taken a nosedive’. Yaprak Gürsoy, writing 
on security sector reform in Turkey, argues that despite some gains in civil–military 
relations (though civilian control over the military is not complete), reform in the 
police and intelligence sectors has not resulted in democratisation, mainly because 
the motives behind the reform have been politically charged, with the aim of ‘creating 
loyal security services’.
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The Gender Wars in Turkey: A Litmus Test of Democracy?
Deniz Kandiyoti
Professor Deniz Kandiyoti is Emeritus Professor in Development Studies and Professorial 
Research Associate at the Centre of Contemporary Central Asia & the Caucasus at SOAS, Uni-
versity of London. 
Introduction
On a freezing cold day on 21 February 2015 a group of men wearing skirts marched 
towards the iconic Taksim square:1 they were protesting the brutal attempted rape 
and murder of Özgecan Aslan, a 20-year-old student from Mersin, whose mutilated 
and partly burnt body was discovered in a riverbed on 13 February. This came on the 
heels of nation-wide demonstrations staged by women’s groups: among their striking 
slogans was ‘Özgecan is not our lament but our rebellion.’
Gruesome sexual assaults and murders of women are, alas, quite commonplace 
throughout the world. These seldom lead to overtly political contestations. In Turkey, 
however, things rapidly escalated into full-blown attacks on the current regime and 
its policies. How do we account for this hyper-politicisation? Does the realm of gen-
der-based violence and women’s rights serve to articulate deeper layers of disaffection? 
What does that tell us about the state of democracy in Turkey?
Before moving on to these critical questions, I would like to examine briefly the range 
of reactions elicited by this tragic event, since they provide some important clues about 
the struggles over the soul of the Turkish polity. One set of reactions focused on how 
to segregate women better in order to protect them from such assaults (such as pro-
posals for women-only pink buses or separate carriages on the subway system). Some 
politicians, such as Ayşenur Islam, the family and social policies minister, even called 
for the reinstatement of the death penalty, which was abolished in 2004 as a part of the 
democratisation process set in motion to meet European Union standards. 
A diametrically opposed reaction came from those who mounted a virulent critique of 
the type of society and mentality that puts women in peril unless they are segregated. 
A great furore was created by the president’s own words when he stated that he con-
demned violence against women because ‘men are the custodians of women’ (kadinlar 
erkeklerin emanetidir) and have a duty to protect them.2 This triggered howls of protest 
1  Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Turkish Men Wear Skirts in Protest for Victimized Women’, Hürriyet Daily 
News, 21 February 2015. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-men-wear-skirts-
in-protest-for-victimized-women.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78661&NewsCatID=339 (accessed 6 
October 2015).
2  Ezgi Başaran, ‘Feministim, Size Emaneti Gösteriyorum!’, Radikal, 18 February 2015. Available 
at http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/feministim_size_emaneti_gosteriyorum-1295587 
(accessed 6 October 2015).
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from women’s rights defenders at the demeaning implications of this statement, and 
a demand for rights, not protection. Feminists were reprimanded by the president for 
having ‘no relation to our religion and our civilisation’ (ya senin bizim dinimizle medeni-
yetimizle ilgin yok ki). He also bitterly resented the politicisation of this issue, apparently 
unaware that this might be the harvest of seeds planted under AKP (Justice and Devel-
opment Party) rule. 
These debates had clearly struck a chord. On 8 March, International Women’s Day, 
television channels were beaming not only demonstrations and events (including a 
men’s run ‘against violence’) but an announcement by the prime minister, Ahmet, that 
he was embarking on a new 2016–19 action plan on ‘Fighting Violence against Wom-
en’.3 The president delivered an address vowing to make the elimination of violence 
against women his personal mission – in the same way, he said, that he had earlier put 
his weight behind a campaign to combat smoking.
In what follows, I would like to argue that the politicisation marking these debates was 
in no small measure triggered by the fact that stirring up moral anxieties over wom-
en’s conduct and propriety had become one of the key pillars of the AKP’s populist 
discourse: a discourse that pits a virtuous ‘us’ – the real people – against an immoral 
‘them’. Before elaborating on this theme, it may be pertinent to chronicle the gradual 
unravelling of women’s rights between 2002 and 2015. 
On a Slippery Slope: The Unravelling of Women’s Rights
During the early years of the AKP regime the women’s movement in Turkey achieved 
significant gains in the sphere of legal reforms. Between 2002 and 2004 a vigorous 
campaign led by a coalition of women’s and sexual liberties groups – the Platform 
for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code – resulted in the adoption of a draft law 
on 26 September 2004. With the reform of the civil code in 2001 that preceded these 
amendments, the most progressive pieces of legislation since the republican reforms 
of Kemalist Turkey were adopted.
Turkey was accepted as a candidate for EU membership in December 1999 and was 
therefore required to bring its legal, political and economic system into alignment 
with EU standards. Quite clearly, the women’s movement had seized this moment as 
a window of opportunity to press for further demands. However, the members of the 
group that had initiated demands for reform – the Women’s Working Group on the 
Penal Code (WWRG) – were stonewalled in their attempts to seek a dialogue with the 
new AKP government and finally had to resort to a public media and lobbying cam-
paign, expanding their initiative to form a broader national platform. These efforts 
were successful.
3  Anadolu Agency, ‘Turkish Leaders Celebrate Women’s Day, Promise Better Living Conditions’, 
Daily Sabah, 8 March 2015. Available at http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/03/08/turkish-lead-
ers-celebrate-womens-day-promise-better-living-conditions (accessed 6 October 2015).
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At this stage, support for gender-equality platforms played well for Turkey in the inter-
national arena. During the first term of the AKP (2002–7) Turkey took a lead role for 
the empowerment of women in the US-led Broader Middle East and North Africa 
Initiative (BMENA) in the context of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD). The 
reforms of its civil and penal codes furthered its attempts to meet the criteria for 
EU accession, accelerating the already existing efforts of the women’s movement in 
Turkey. In 2009, a Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and 
Women was established for the first time. Turkey was the first country to ratify the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against 
Women and Domestic Violence (CAHVIO), the Istanbul Convention, in 2012. 
This intensive period of engagement of women’s non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) with state authorities goes some way towards explaining the mood of utter 
consternation provoked by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when, in the 
course of a consultation meeting with women’s NGOs (some 60 organisations were 
present) on 18 July 2010, he declared: ‘I do not believe in the equality of men and 
women. I believe in equal opportunities. Men and women are different and comple-
mentary (mütemmim).’
This intervention signalled that regardless of Turkey’s signatory status to the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
Prime Minister had chosen to nod in the direction of fıtrat, an Islamic tenet that attri-
butes distinct and divinely ordained natures to men and women.4 Women’s principal, 
and preferably sole, vocation should be home making and motherhood. This has now 
become such an established tenet of public discourse that the period when it still had 
shock value seems like a distant memory.
Institutional changes followed. The General Directorate of Women’s Status and Prob-
lems, the national machinery for the promotion of gender equality, established as a 
requirement of the CEDAW process, was created in 1990. Women’s NGOs were actively 
incorporated in policy formulation and in lobbying activities. The General Directorate 
was abolished in 2011 and replaced by the Ministry of the Family and Social Policies, 
where discrimination against women was placed alongside the protection of children, 
the disabled and the elderly, clearly marking it out as a social welfare issue. Women were 
being cast primarily as objects of ‘protection’ rather than fully fledged civic subjects.
This already polarised context was further inflamed by the fact that the embarrassing 
Uludere incident in December 2011 (where 34 Kurdish smugglers were killed near 
the Iraqi border after the Turkish military mistakenly thought them to be Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) militants) was rather unexpectedly turned into a debate about 
abortion and a Turkish woman’s right to choose. Speaking to a 26 May 2012 meeting 
of the AKP’s women’s branches in Ankara, the Prime Minister made a connection 
between abortion and the murder of 34 civilians. ‘I see abortion as murder’, he told the 
gathered women. The Prime Minister further suggested that abortion and Turkey’s 
4  Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘A Tangled Web: The Politics of Gender in Turkey’, 50.50 Inclusive Democracy, 
5 January 2011. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/tangled-web-poli-
tics-of-gender-in-turkey (accessed 6 October 2015).
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high rate of caesarean section (C-section) births, which he claimed make it harder for a 
woman to give birth again, were part of a ‘hidden’ plot to reduce Turkey’s population. 
The Health Minister compounded matters by stating that women who had become 
pregnant as a result of rape should still give birth, and let the government take care 
of their babies. Predictably enough, this led to women’s protest demonstrations bear-
ing slogans such as ‘Prime Minister Hands off Our Bodies’ and, more mischievously, 
‘Tayyip the Vagina Vigilante’ (Tayyip Vajina Behçisi).
It is worth noting that that no significant legal changes followed these debates. There 
is little need for changes on the statute books for actual practices to change on the 
ground. It is now a matter of routine that public hospitals work with de facto directives 
that restrict access to abortions5 and discourage C-sections. However, despite Erdoğan’s 
declared aim to raise ‘a pious generation’, overt legislative actions such as lowering 
the age of veiling in schools to 10 years old were gradual and sporadic (although new 
legislation has been gathering pace in the field of education). Instead, public space 
became saturated with messages and exhortations (which I have dubbed amr-bil maruf 
by stealth elsewhere)6 targeting the life worlds of citizens by monitoring their lifestyle 
choices, such as limiting access to alcohol, proscribing displays of intimacy in public or 
attempting to ban co-ed dorms for university students. It is perhaps no surprise that 
youth protests (including the forms of expression in evidence during the Gezi events of 
the summer of 2013) targeted the hectoring and moralistic tone of the head of state on 
occasions when he took on the role of the strict and scolding paterfamilias.7 However, 
the special appeal held by the policing of the comportment of women cannot be simply 
attributed to enforcing norms of Islamic modesty but constitutes, as I shall attempt to 
show, an important part of a multi-faceted political field.
The Siren Song of Populism: Drawing a Veil over Class ?
When Turkey’s deputy prime minister, the soft-spoken and urbane Bülent Arınç, 
declared in the summer of 2014, during a public address marking the Bayram fes-
tivities at the end of Ramazan, that women should refrain from laughing in public 
and must remain chaste (iffetli) at all times, he created quite a stir in both the local 
and international media.8 If we take the trouble to analyse his address more closely, 
the Deputy Prime Minister’s injunction against female laughter turns out not to be a 
5  Some cases have received a great deal of publicity because of the deleterious consequences for 
the women concerned: Dilara Gürcü, ‘Erkek ellerini Ayşe Kocaoğlu’nun bedeninden çektik, sıra 
geri kalan tüm kadınların kürtaj hakkında!’, Blog Yazarları, 26 February 2015. Available at http://
t24.com.tr/yazarlar/dilara-gurcu/erkek-elleri-ayse-kocaoglunun-bedeninden-cektik-sira-geri-ka-
lan-tum-kadinlarin-kurtaj-hakkinda,11357 (accessed 6 October 2015).
6  Deniz Kandiyoti,‘The Travails of the Secular: Puzzle and Paradox in Turkey’, Economy and Society 
41/4 (2012), pp. 513–31.
7  Deniz Kandiyoti,‘Contesting Patriarchy-as-Governance: Lessons from Youth-Led Activism’, 50.50 
Inclusive Democracy, 7 March 2014. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/
contesting-patriarchy-as-governance-lessons-from-youth-led-activism (accessed 6 October 2015).
8  Agence France-Presse in Istanbul, ‘Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Says Women Should Not Laugh 
Out Loud’, Guardian, 29 July 2014. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/turk-
ish-minister-women-laugh-loud-bulent-arinc (accessed 6 October 2015).
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simple call for Islamic propriety, but part of a broader package containing some of the 
key ingredients of the AKP’s populist appeal. First, he introduced a touch of nostalgia 
for an age when ‘young girls used to blush and lower their eyes when someone looked 
at them’ – presumably an age of superior Ottoman morality unsullied by the evils of 
modern Turkey. More intriguingly, he condemned the excessive use of cars, and the 
consumption of lots of petrol, as well as the frequent use of mobile phones. This was 
clearly a call against consumerism and frivolous leisure, pointing to women as the per-
petrators of such acts of frivolity and waste. Could the Deputy Prime Minister have been 
reassuring his conservative popular base that he endorses the Islamic values of sobriety 
and lack of ostentation by targeting women as reckless consumerists? If so, why?
Populism AKP-style relies heavily on a distinction between ‘us’, the ‘real’ people 
(God-fearing, AKP-voting Sunni Muslims), and a ‘them’ consisting of all political 
detractors and ethnic and religious minorities, cast as potentially treasonous ‘others’. It 
is the person of the leader who represents ‘the national will’ and creates a direct bond 
with the people, bypassing the cumbersome institutions that provide the checks and 
balances characterising modern democracies – hence his current drive for an executive 
and powerful presidency. 
This populism also rests upon a politics of ressentiment that encourages the projection 
of hatred onto groups or classes seen as privileged and exclusionary and as oppressors 
of the national ‘underdog’. The country’s metropolitan, secular middle classes have 
long been routine targets of this discourse. However, they are currently eclipsed by 
the members of the so-called ‘parallel state’, a reference to the Gülen movement that 
is seen to be behind the alleged corruption scandal that erupted on 17 December 
2013. The leader routinely plays up his humble origins, uses street language, projects 
a macho image and mocks the educated classes.9 This, no doubt, serves to cement the 
identification between the leader and the popular masses.
However, after over a decade in power, deepening class cleavages between the AKP 
ruling elite and their less advantaged followers have become glaringly evident. These 
have been papered over with reference to shared religiosity and cultural affinity as 
well as dislike and mistrust of assorted ‘others’, seasoned with messianic faith in the 
Turks’ vocation as leaders of all Muslim nations. This latter imagery was flamboyantly 
on display when the President greeted Mahmoud Abbas on a state visit flanked by 16 
costumed warriors representing the states founded by the Turks.
9  During the presidential campaign of 2014 he derided the opposition candidate, who is a professor 
and speaks three foreign languages, by interjecting ‘So what? Are we looking for an interpreter?’ 
Mocking diplomats and others as ‘monser’ (from the French mon cher) is part of the same arsenal.
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The story of capitalist accumulation in Turkey under the AKP is no longer a tale of 
self-reliant, pious Anatolian entrepreneurs making their way in a new market economy, 
but one of sustained government intervention in the economy in support of politically 
privileged entrepreneurs.10 No corruption scandal was needed for ordinary citizens to 
take note of the luxurious homes, expensive cars and lavish lifestyles of the new rich. 
Indeed, the sight of expensively veiled women in designer sunglasses, driving SUVs 
and talking on their mobile phones, is quite commonplace. This raises alternative inter-
pretations of the Deputy Prime Minister’s intervention concerning women’s laughter: 
invoking women’s comportment and (lack of) propriety is a useful means of consolidat-
ing support across classes around a deeply shared value – the control of women. 
Protecting the Deserving: The Populist Deal for Women
How do women voters respond to the AKP’s political message? An exit poll conducted 
during the presidential elections in the summer of 2014 showed that 55 per cent of 
women voters had voted for Erdoğan as against 48 per cent of men. Simply put, Erdoğan 
would not have got through at the first round if it hadn’t been for the female vote. This 
finding may come as a surprise on the back of my earlier analysis that suggests we have 
been witnessing an unravelling of women’s rights. It is therefore important to capture 
the complex dynamics behind women’s loyalty to the AKP, which rests on both a new 
sense of entitlement and a deep familiarity (if not comfort) with a patriarchal trade-off 
that offers conditional protection in exchange for acquiescence and consent.
Having come to power with a resounding majority, the AKP was able to embark on pub-
licly funded social welfare programmes. Welfare entitlements that made up 0.5 per cent 
of GDP in 2002 rose to 1.5 per cent of GDP by 2013. Sixty per cent of welfare recipients 
are women. The family is key to benefit provisions in Turkey and women are principally 
targeted as mothers and as carers of children and the elderly, sick and disabled.11 
Moreover, women are not just passive consumers of benefits but also active participants 
in daily interfaces with public bodies at the local level. For instance, municipalities 
which previously provided only limited charity aid and in-kind poverty relief now have 
significant financial resources at their disposal and offer additional social services and 
benefits. In Istanbul, the most populous city, for instance, a wide network of Neigh-
bourhood Lodges (Semt Konaklari) tied to different districts offer diverse amenities, 
from soup kitchens, showers and laundries to health (screening services, vaccination 
and advice) and educational services (vocational training for adults, literacy classes for 
women, nurseries and tutorial help for school-age children), not to mention cultural 
activities such as concerts, conferences and excursions. Women of the popular classes, 
especially those of rural extraction, experience a new sense of ‘citizenship through 
10  Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, The New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, 
Religion and Business (Cheltenham, 2014).
11  For a collection of essays on the gendered impacts of social policy see Saniye Dedeoğlu and Adem 
Yavuz Elveren (eds), Gender and Society in Turkey: The Impact of Neoliberal Policies, Political Islam and EU 
Accession (London, 2012).
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entitlement’. Furthermore, although the funding for these activities comes from tax-
payers’ money, sometimes augmented by charitable giving, the recipients perceive it as 
the exclusive result of party largesse – a belief no doubt cemented by the distribution 
of in-kind help for winter fuel and basic foodstuffs from party coffers, especially during 
election periods. 
Nonetheless, the proof of women’s loyalty does not lie in voting behaviour only, but 
in their demonstration that they are among the worthy who have absorbed the party’s 
message about their God-given vocation as mothers and home makers and as those 
who understand that only the deserving will be protected. Two starkly contrasting 
episodes illustrate this proposition. The first relates to an alleged attack on a veiled 
woman in front of Istanbul’s Kabataş dock at the height of the Gezi protests. Although 
later challenged by CCTV footage as possibly bogus, this incident had the then Prime 
Minister fuming over the affront to ‘our sister’, which demonstrated the violent, bar-
baric and anti-religious disposition of the protesters.12 An earlier episode concerns the 
case of a woman demonstrator who in June 2011 climbed on a panzer during a protest 
in Ankara and was savagely beaten by the police, suffering a hip fracture.13 The Prime 
Minister, belittling the incident, asked at a public meeting: ‘was she a girl or a woman, 
I don’t know’ (kız mıdır kadın mıdır, bilemem). By casting aspersions on her virginity he 
left his listeners in no doubt that he thought her of small virtue, as would be expected 
from her unseemly, unfeminine behaviour. The message could not be clearer: only the 
deserving (our sisters) are worthy of protection; the rest, and especially women with 
the audacity to break the norms of modesty and to protest in public, put themselves 
in jeopardy.
The case of Özgecan Aslan occasioned deep revulsion and despair not only because 
of the gruesome nature of her murder but because she was so blatantly ‘innocent’; a 
20-year-old commuting between home and college who fought her assailant and paid 
with her life. She was seen not only as the victim of an individual rapist/murderer but as 
a martyr of a regime that had made women’s lives cheap in the process of spinning out 
its dangerous, polarising discourse for electoral gain. This latest episode of violence 
ignited all the pent-up fury (and grief) of sections of society that were feeling trampled 
upon and could no longer recognise themselves in the ‘New Turkey’ taking shape by 
fiat and, increasingly, through coercion. This is how the tragedy of Özgecan Aslan’s 
murder became an inadvertent litmus test of the state of Turkish democracy itself.
12  Barçin Yinanç, ‘Turkey Presents Sex, Lies and Kabataş’, Hürriyet Daily News, 10 March 2015. 
Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-presents-sex-lies-and-kabatas.aspx?page-
ID=449&nID=79409&NewsCatID=412 (accessed 6 October 2015).
13  ‘Başbakan: “O kadin, kız mıdır kadın mıdır?”’, CNN TÜRK.com, 4 June 2011. Available at http://
www.cnnturk.com/2011/yazarlar/06/04/basbakan.o.kadin.kiz.midir.kadin.midir/618955.0/ (accessed 6 
October 2015).
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This paper is based on observations from working on Turkey for international human 
rights organisations over more than a decade, during which Turkey first pursued 
and then cooled to its European Union (EU) accession bid.1 The conditionality of the 
accession process seemed a decade ago to constitute the best means for the country 
to democratise its institutions and reform its laws and practices, but today the state 
of Turkey’s judiciary and media, its political leaders’ resistance to accountable gover-
nance and their willingness to muzzle critics all point to the failure of the process.
The paper looks back critically at Turkey’s law-making culture over the last decade 
with respect to advancing the protection of human rights. It reflects on how Tur-
key’s presentation of legislative changes as progress under the scrutiny of the EU, 
UN and Council of Europe helped skew the facts and divert attention from the lack 
of institutional underpinning for reform, the lack of political accountability, judicial 
independence and oversight mechanisms, and other structural factors with implica-
tions for a culture of rights. The paper also briefly addresses a certain wishful idea 
of civil society on the part of intergovernmental bodies as the effector of change and 
conduit by which democratic laws, attitudes and institutions could emerge.
Changing the Legal ramework
As a prerequisite for EU accession, the Copenhagen criteria point to ‘stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities’.2 To this end, the first AKP (Justice and Development Party) government 
received huge praise when, back in 2004, it consolidated on the move made by its 
predecessor coalition government in abolishing the death penalty in wartime as well 
as peacetime. It went on that year to rewrite the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code entirely, and to continue the previous government’s effort at passing a series of 
1  The author has worked as Turkey Researcher for Amnesty International (2003–7) and as Senior 
Turkey Researcher for Human Rights Watch (2007 onwards). The paper was prepared in March 
2015 and makes only passing reference to developments in Turkey after that period. 
2  For accession criteria as described by the European Commission, see the website http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm (accessed 28 July 2015).
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‘harmonisation laws’ intended to bring Turkey’s laws into alignment with those of EU 
countries and the terms of the acquis communautaire.3 Commentators were astounded 
by the pace of change and the ambitious scope of it.
To mention a few significant measures in the period 2002–5, military control of the 
National Security Council, a key body that had been able to direct previous gov-
ernments, was ended. The jurisdiction of military courts was reduced. Particularly 
impressive in view of Turkey’s notorious record on torture were steps to reduce police 
detention times, accompanied by the political message stressing zero tolerance of 
torture and the abolition of incommunicado detention. In the penal code the legal 
definition of torture was extended and the increase in penalties for the crime seemed 
to spell a resolution to stamp out the practice.
As has been well documented, women’s rights groups played an important and well-co-
ordinated role in improving the legislation protecting women from killings in the 
name of honour by reducing scope for sentence reductions, getting marital rape rec-
ognised as a crime, getting rid of discriminatory language, and increasing penalties for 
sexual assault and rape in the penal code.4
An optimistic focus on these aspects certainly distracted attention from sections of the 
new penal code outlining so-called crimes against the state and terrorism imported from 
the old code in revised form. It was at that point difficult to foresee how, just a couple of 
years after the new penal code became law, there would be a huge increase in the use of 
these laws (especially provisions relating to membership of armed organisations). Also 
unforeseen was the fact that the police practice of extracting statements from suspects 
coercively was to be replaced with an alliance between the police and the courts in dra-
matically increasingly the (abusive) use of wiretapping and surveillance powers.
Very often too after old laws got incorporated into the new penal code, the govern-
ment averted criticisms with the argument that a particular provision should not be 
judged until a pattern of implementation had emerged. This was frequently said, for 
example, to justify not abolishing the slightly revised article on ‘insulting and deriding 
Turkishness’ incorporated into the new 2004 penal code from the old one, and in 2008 
again slightly revised in wording but not repealed. Extremely slow criminal proceed-
ings in Turkey’s courts meant that any pattern could take years to emerge, even as a 
spate of cases appeared and writers such as Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink were among 
3  The body of European law and regulations making up the acquis is divided into thematic chapters: http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm 
(accessed 28 July 2015). Among numerous publications discussing Turkey’s nine harmonisation 
packages and other legal amendments is Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Gençkaya, Democratization and 
the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey (Budapest, 2009). The AKP government published a very 
favourable 2013 summary of legal changes made in The Silent Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change 
and Transformation Inventory, 2002–2012 (Ankara, 2013) Available at http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/snetix/
solutions/KDGM/resources/uploads/files/ingilizce.pdf (accessed 28 July 2015).
4  For a summary of some of the gains, see a description by one of the organisations, Women for 
Women’s Human Rights: ‘National Advocacy’. Available at http://www.wwhr.org/national-advocacy/ 
(accessed 28 July 2015).
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those prosecuted under this article.5 Dink was assassinated on 19 January 2007 after 
having been repeatedly convicted under this article.
Beyond the wholesale revision of the penal code and criminal procedure code, the 
practice of changing a lot of laws at once, beginning with the harmonisation law pack-
ages and continuing with other omnibus bills offering revisions to multiple and often 
unrelated laws, entrenched a mode of law-making which, for various reasons, was 
problematic even where the content of the amendments was positive. While aimed 
at demonstrating commitment to the EU accession process, assorted laws drafted 
within ministries in a process lacking transparency and without proper debate were 
merged into unwieldy omnibus bills, which turned out to be impenetrable to the par-
liamentarians who passed them. The bills typically contained substantive and highly 
significant changes to some laws buried among technical or procedural revisions of 
others, making it difficult to second guess what was intended with a law and to separate 
out the important aspects.
The explanations of the laws offered by the bureaucrats who had drafted them did 
not elaborate sufficiently on the implications of the revisions, but rather embodied a 
degree of political spin aimed at presenting the bills in Brussels as evidence of progress 
and further conformity with norms in EU countries. The ruling party’s parliamentary 
majority meant that such bills passed through the parliamentary commission stage and 
then the general assembly itself often without proper debate or scrutiny by parliamen-
tarians, let alone public consultation or wider debate.
The media, and in particular a handful of journalists with legal expertise, have played 
an important role in creating what public debate there has been in Turkey about the 
content of proposed legislation, and probably also explaining that content to most pol-
iticians themselves. Law faculties and professors have played almost no independent 
public role in enlightening the public in Turkey on the content and implications of 
laws. I would argue that these criticisms broadly apply regardless of whether the legal 
reform in question has been more or less positive.
Pushing through sweeping laws risks also becoming a means of justifying negative 
existing practices by codifying them in law (with the March 2015 domestic security law 
a case in point). All in all, a legalistic approach has substituted for a real commitment 
to reform. It has proved diversionary because it has forced Turkey’s bar associations 
and civil society groups, and Turkey’s EU interlocutors, to spend an inordinate amount 
of time engaging with the wording of a plethora of laws termed reform packages, to 
assess conformity with EU standards, European Court case law and the European Con-
vention. Mechanisms for oversight of implementation of laws and for scrutinising the 
consequences of a legal amendment after it passed into law have been largely absent.
5  Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Article 301: How the Law on “Denigrating Turkishness” Is an 
Insult to Free Expression’, Public Document, March 2006. Available at http://www.refworld.org/
pdfid/44c611504.pdf (accessed 28 July 2015). Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Government Amend-
ments Will Not Protect Free Speech’, 16 April 2008. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/
turkey-government-amendments-will-not-protect-free-speech (accessed 28 July 2015).
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Swathes of legislation claimed to represent reform initiatives have provided the sense 
that there is movement and change afoot, something on the table to discuss even in the 
face of restrictive or abusive practices perpetuated elsewhere. I would argue that this 
legalism, which cannot be said to constitute a holistic response capable of addressing 
the substance of Turkey’s rights issues, has also substituted for real social policy solu-
tions and even substitutes for political will to effect change.
The growing authoritarianism of the past two years in Turkey has served to demonstrate 
how repeated legal amendments can also be blown away in a moment with more laws in 
a context where legislation is not the outcome of a reform-driven political orientation 
and lacks institutional underpinning. The pattern in Turkey has been constant amend-
ment of laws by means of more laws, and frequent backtracking. It is worth briefly 
reviewing the legal advances and setbacks of the past decade to demonstrate this.
Reversing Reform
One of the first signs of a backward slide on legislative reform efforts came just one 
year after the new penal code had entered into force in mid-2005, with the govern-
ment’s amendments to the anti-terror law. As in many other countries, this was reactive 
legislation, passed straight after three days of violent protests in late March 2006 in 
which 14 people, including children, died in the southeast during clashes with police. 
The clashes had been prompted by the Diyarbakir funerals of Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) members killed in Muş. At the time the Turkish government ignored 
human rights groups’ criticisms of the amendments.6
Terrorism law amendments were followed in 2007 by revision of the law on the powers 
and duties of the police. Both laws were amended in such a way as to increase penalties 
and widen the powers of the security forces, including increasing the use of firearms 
and powers to stop individuals and check their ID. This contributed to a rise in com-
plaints of ill-treatment.7 Part of this was in response to the complaint by the police that 
the new criminal procedures introduced in 2005 had meant they now lacked sufficient 
powers to fight crime. Both moves contributed practically and symbolically to giving 
greater initiative to the police, which in turn strengthened their role in criminal inves-
tigations. It is no coincidence that 2007–8 marked the start of a pattern of arbitrary use 
of terrorism laws in Turkey, justified by Court of Cassation precedent rulings, resulting 
in prosecution and prolonged pre-trial detention of individuals who joined protests, 
and then more generally of political activists, students and journalists.8
6  Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Briefing on the Wide-Ranging, Arbitrary and Restrictive Draft 
Revisions to the Law to Fight Terrorism’, 12 June 2006. Available at www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/
proasyl/fm_redakteure/Newsletter_Anhaenge/116/LawtoFightTerrorism.doc (accessed 28 July 2015).
7  Human Rights Watch’s December 2008 report on police violence documented the impact of the 2007 
amendments: ‘Turkey: Rising Police Violence Goes Unpunished’, 5 December 2008. Available at http://
www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/05/turkey-rising-police-violence-goes-unpunished (accessed 29 July 2015).
8  Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Protesting as a Terrorist Offense: The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to 
Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey (New York, 2010). Available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/turkey1110webwcover.pdf (accessed 28 July 2015).
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Parliamentary bills amending multiple laws in the interests of ‘harmonisation’ pro-
ceeded through a period of mass arrests and trials (multiple mass trials of Kurdish 
demonstrators and activists on terrorism organisation membership charges from 2008 
onwards, plus the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials).9 In an indication of 
the lack of synchronisation between rhetoric and facts, the government championed 
legal reform packages focused on improving the functioning of the criminal justice 
system as thousands found themselves the unfortunate victims of arbitrary prosecution 
and incarceration pending trial.10 Mass arrests of Kurds were also happening at a time 
when the government had openly stated that it was committed to a peace process with 
the Kurds. Ministry of Justice judicial reform packages tweaking laws concerning crim-
inal procedure and due process, in response to the plethora of European Court rulings 
against Turkey and finding a pattern of violations of the right to fair trial, went on over 
the period 2011–13 simultaneously with a mass of new fair-trial violations.
Turning to the past two years, we see a flood of new legislative reforms in the wake of 
the government’s efforts to strip away the powers of its former ally, the Fethullah Gülen 
movement, and suppress investigation of corruption allegations implicating ministers 
and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s own family.11 Laws have amended the struc-
ture, composition or powers of institutions such as the Higher Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors, the National Intelligence Agency (MİT), the top courts and some lower 
courts, the police force and the gendarmerie.12 Through repeated revision of Turkey’s 
much-criticised internet law, the government attempted to impose new restrictions and 
facilitate the removal of online content.13 All such laws contain fundamentally prob-
lematic provisions either directly contravening or against the spirit of the European 
Convention and ignoring the case law of the European Court. A highly contested omni-
bus bill known as the ‘Domestic Security package’, further increasing police powers and 
undermining judicial oversight of arrest, became law in March 2015.14
9  Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Kurdish Party Members’ Trial Violates Rights’, 18 April 2011. Available 
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/18/turkey-kurdish-party-members-trial-violates-rights (accessed 
28 July 2015). For an op-ed on the Ergenekon trial, see Emma Sinclair-Webb, ‘The Turkish Trial that 
Fell Far Short’, New York Times, 6 August 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/opin-
ion/global/the-turkish-trial-that-fell-far-short.html?_r=0 (accessed 28 July 2015).
10  Human Rights Watch’s statements on the reform bills include ‘Turkey: Draft Reform Law Falls 
Short’, 13 February 2012. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/13/turkey-draft-reform-law-
falls-short (accessed 6 October 2015).
11  For more on aspects of the background to the Erdoğan–Gülen movement split not elaborated 
here, see Mustafa Akyol, ‘What You Should Know about Turkey’s AKP–Gulen Conflict’, Al Monitor, 
3 January 2014. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/akp-gulen-conflict-
guide.html (accessed 29 July 2015).
12  Revisions to all these laws are summarised in Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey’s Human Rights 
Rollback’, 29 September 2014. Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/29/turkeys-hu-
man-rights-rollback/recommendations-reform (accessed 28 July 2015).
13  Constanze Letsch, ‘Turkey Pushes Through Raft of “Draconian” Internet Restrictions’, Guardian, 6 
February 2015. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/turkey-internet-law-cen-
sorship-democracy-threat-opposition (accessed 29 July2015).
14  For a detailed summary of the content of the bill, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Secu-
rity Bill Undermines Rights’, 11 December 2014. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/11/
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The Turkish government’s line on many of these laws that have been passed has been 
to insist that the letter of the draft law and the intent behind it are alignment with 
the EU and the Council of Europe. To criticisms of the domestic security bill, leading 
government figures repeatedly argued its conformity with EU norms, Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu commented: ‘Show us just one article that violates EU standards; 
show just one clause that is against universal democratic standards.’15 Further evidence 
of this official line came with the publication in March 2014 in the Official Gazette 
of a long document the government termed a ‘human rights action plan’, outlining 
many planned reforms at a moment when the government passed many other laws to 
suppress the corruption scandal.16 There is still a preoccupation at a high level with 
maintaining that the aim is EU standards even as the government pursues measures 
that take Turkey in the opposite direction.
Above all, law-making in Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to slip back 
to a default position where the state authorities arm themselves with special powers 
or amend existing laws to widen powers enabling them to sidestep rules. The default 
position is laws that cancel or take precedence over other laws (as several of the laws 
passed last year demonstrate). Thus, periodically, the police law gets changed to offer 
the police more powers to stop people and potentially detain them, and to enable 
the executive to bypass judicial authority and oversight by invoking ill-defined con-
cerns about public order. State security courts get abolished (in 2004) but in name 
only, and are replaced with a similar system of specially authorised courts, which in 
turn get abolished (March 2014) but then reintroduced less than a year later (Febru-
ary 2015). There are countless other examples, including laws effectively preventing 
investigation of politicians, public officials and intelligence officers, accompanied by a 
crackdown on judges and prosecutors who embark on investigations conflicting with 
government interests.
The reasons for these cycles of more or less restrictive law-making, it may be sug-
gested, lie once again in the absence of coherent reform policy on rights-based issues. 
For the foreseeable future, a clientelist political culture, an absence of robust institu-
tions to conduct oversight and monitoring of implementation of laws, and a culture 
turkey-security-bill-undermines-rights (accessed 28 July 2015). See also Amnesty Internation-
al’s response to its March 2015 passing into law, ‘Turkey: New Bill Gives Police “Draconian” New 
Anti-Protest Powers’, 27 March 2015. Available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/turkey-
new-bill-gives-police-draconian-new-anti-protest-powers (accessed 28 July 2015).
15  Davutoğlu quoted in Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Security Bill Fully Complies with EU Norms, Davu-
toğlu Pledges, Challenging Opposition’, Hürriyet Daily News, 10 February 2015. Available at http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/security-bill-fully-complies-with-eu-norms-davutoglu-pledges-challeng-
ing-opposition-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78163&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 28 July 2015). For the 
Human Rights Watch response to Davutoğlu on domestic security bill conformity with EU standards, 
see Emma Sinclair-Webb, ‘Is Turkey Just Copying the EU in Increasing Police Powers?’, Hürriyet 
Daily News, 14 February 2015. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/is-turkey-just-copying-
the-eu-in-increasing-police-powers-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78328&NewsCatID=396 (accessed 28 
July 2015).
16  ‘Turkish Government Unveils Blueprint to Boost Rights, Freedoms’, Hürriyet Daily News, 4 March 
2014. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-unveils-blueprint-to-boost-
rights-freedoms.aspx?pageID=238&nid=63164 (accessed 29 July 2015).
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of impunity undermine the impact of positive legislation. The judiciary in Turkey has 
always been a barometer of politics. Developments over the past year (mass rotations 
and executive interference, and most recently decisions to try judges and prosecutors 
on the basis of decisions conducted in their professional capacity) have not set the 
judiciary on another path and may have considerably worsened the situation by fur-
ther eroding the judiciary’s independence. Even the right of individual petition to the 
constitutional court may now provide less possibility of redress than it did last year.
The Role of Civil Society
Turning to civil society, what role have human rights groups been able to play in rela-
tion to the swathes of laws three AKP governments have passed in the name of reform?
In the run-up to securing candidacy for EU accession at the end of 2005, the first AKP 
government demonstrated unprecedented interest in engaging with domestic and 
international human rights groups with which previous governments had had minimal 
or no contact, and which were widely regarded by public officials and most politicians 
in Turkey as working against the country’s interests. In 2004, human rights groups had 
several meetings with then Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül 
and the Reform Monitoring Group (comprised of key ministers), and separate meet-
ings with those ministers – Interior and Justice. Even meetings with the heads of the 
top courts were part of this picture. These meetings provided a forum for transmitting 
messages about human rights reforms directly.
Government engagement with human rights groups happened because of a percep-
tion that the groups had power at that moment to influence the EU in providing a 
more or less positive or negative impression of Turkey, and because the government 
itself was ready at that time to adopt a reform language. While some individuals really 
wanted this engagement and to follow a reform agenda, others were clearly at the time 
either ideologically uncomfortable with talking to people they regarded as enemies of 
the state, or concerned that any implication that they might be capitulating to foreign-
ers might play badly with nationalist sentiment. While there was a spectrum of views 
about human rights among government officials, this level of engagement was not 
repeated after 2004, and it became almost impossible for leading international human 
rights NGOs to get a meeting with Erdoğan after that period.
The years 2003–5 thus saw a brief opening, and then a reversion to the default position 
of the government mainly being closed to human rights NGOs and any critical ele-
ments of civil society. Nevertheless, criticisms of Turkey’s human rights record by civil 
society groups and by the EU were regularly reported in the media and thus continued 
to reach a public.
By the time of the third AKP government, engagement with civil society organisations 
closer to its own constituency turned into active efforts to co-opt them and even, in 
some cases, to set up government organised non-government organisations (GONGOs). 
This has been particularly evident with the demise of the Gülenists and is arguably 
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motivated too by an interest in seeing EU funds for civil society reach government 
client organisations. Simultaneously, Erdoğan’s and the third AKP government’s 
increasing moves to muzzle the media would also ensure that criticism of the govern-
ment in most press organisations and TV channels decreased over the same period.
There is much to say about the implications of being kept out in the cold for the 
development of critical civil society in Turkey. For a long time, the impossibility of 
engagement with a bureaucracy and state institutions well insulated against the influ-
ence of citizens’ initiatives certainly contributed to the particular trajectory taken by 
groups working on hard-hitting, politically charged subjects like human rights. With 
any form of citizens’ initiative being cut off after the 1980 military coup, and in the 
wake of the deepening ideological political divisions in the 1970s, the human rights 
NGOs that emerged in Turkey in the 1980s were understandably marked by a political 
colouring. They had initially been centres for left (and later also religious conser-
vative) oppositionists to congregate in after the closing down of politics, the phobic 
suppression of Kurdish identity, and the restriction of the headscarf. If they seemed to 
outsiders to be maximalist and sometimes inward-looking in their aims, and quite at 
odds with the liberal humanist orientation of Amnesty and other international groups, 
they were responsive to the conditions they found themselves in and were shaped by 
those conditions. Solidarity mattered more to them than messages advocating the gov-
ernment adopt international legal norms. They were more alert to an official culture 
which meant government authorities claimed adherence to international law obliga-
tions on paper while turning a blind eye to a proliferation of abusive prosecutions of 
their critics.
There is also much to say about domestic human rights groups’ changing approaches, 
style of activism, and engagement with each other and with international groups. In the 
period 2003–6, there were considerable efforts at working together across the political 
spectrum, and some of these relationships and forms of cooperation have survived. 
The move towards greater professionalisation of critically engaged civil society has 
been a long process, which has partly been assisted by the increasing funds available to 
run projects from major donors such as the EU, and smaller contributions from other 
donors and embassies. All in all, groups do not benefit from the range of donors that 
other countries do, and there are still bureaucratic obstacles to running associations 
and foundations in Turkey.
Despite the fact that the EU promotes the idea of boosting civil society as a means 
of promoting human rights and democracy, and constantly encourages consultation 
with civil society in terms such as ‘promoting dialogue’ and ‘capacity building’,17 there 
is often a mismatch of expectations and outcomes. Although there is a range of civil 
society organisations, with the minority being critical groups working on critical issues 
such as rights-related themes, policy solutions to politically sensitive issues or efforts 
at redefining citizenship, the paradox is that they are often better known by the EU 
and embassies than by the authorities in Turkey. With the growing government and 
17  See the EU delegation’s website page on civil society development, where many of these terms are pro-
moted: http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-and-civil-society/civil-society-development.html (accessed 29 July 2015). 
The Trajectory of Legal Reform for Advancing Human Rights in Turkey and the Role of Civil Society 23 
presidential intolerance of dissenting voices, these groups have been increasingly mar-
ginalised and sidelined over the past few years.
Mainly restricted to political and ethno-religious networks and solidarities (mostly 
reflected at the national level), those who work with these groups still often see the 
route to contributing positively to change as being through direct participation in 
political life. Many civil society activists and individuals in rights-based organisations 
and think tanks have opted to go into politics (and the general election in June 2015 
was no exception).
Also important to fit into this picture is the established tradition in Turkey’s main-
stream civil society organisations of being highly corporatist and instrumental in 
transmitting the dominant ideology. While in the past Kemalist civil society organi-
sations would call on the society to uphold the values of the Republic, today parts of 
the AKP-supporting civil society have begun to do something of the same sort: directly 
issuing public calls to support the ‘national will’ (Erdoğan and the AKP) and becoming 
directly engaged (as were the Kemalist groups) in a process which seems to spell sup-
port for a party-state model.18
The process of evolving from occupying a more critical position to being part of a kind 
of support base and voice for the government raises interesting questions about the 
notion of civil society, promoted in European Commission circles as the conduit for 
democracy and respect for human rights. Currently, the choice most groups working 
on human rights related issues face in relation to the state is either being co-opted 
or being completely rejected. As such, it is difficult to claim that the role of this part 
of civil society has developed in Turkey over the past decade despite its undoubted 
vibrancy and the fact that there is arguably more ‘activism’ in Turkey than in most 
western European countries.
The civil society most capable of recalibrating the relationship between citizen and 
state has taken the form of social movements and campaigning alliances, more outward 
looking and with wider aims than human rights groups or NGOs working consistently 
on issues. The Gezi Park sit-in and protests were a distinct and important manifesta-
tion of citizen dissatisfaction with top-down governance as well as with Erdoğan himself 
and will undoubtedly have a continuing significance in Turkey across the political 
spectrum. A resonance of Gezi was felt in the countrywide protests over the murder of 
student Özgecan Aslan by an alliance of women’s groups which brought the issue of 
violence against women to centre stage in February 2015. The Kurdish political move-
ment which combines the features of a huge social movement with a growıng political 
representation (aside from the armed movement that spawned it) still possesses the 
greatest potential to bargain with the state. 
18  Civil society groups close to the AKP formed a ‘national will platform’: see http://www.milliirade-
platformu.com/ (accessed 29 July 2015). 
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Introduction
On 14 December 2014, the European Union high representative, Federica Mogherini, 
and the EU commissioner responsible for enlargement, Johannes Hahn, issued a joint 
statement criticising the multiple arrests of journalists in Turkey as ‘incompatible with 
the freedom of media, which is a core principle of democracy’.1 The statement infuri-
ated the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who responded on 17 December: 
‘We do not care if the European Union admits us as a member or not … The EU 
should mind its own business.’2 This was similar to his reaction to the EU’s criticism of 
the ban on Twitter and YouTube in the same year. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan 
responded to that criticism on 20 March 2014: ‘We’ll eradicate Twitter. I don’t care 
what the international community says. Everyone will witness the power of the Turkish 
Republic.’3 It is clear that Turkish government officials tend to see the EU’s criticisms 
of Turkey’s democratisation as meddling in the country’s internal affairs. This is, of 
course, puzzling as Turkey is negotiating for EU accession, and Turkish ability to con-
form to EU democratic principles is a precondition for its membership.4
When the accession negotiations with the EU began in 2005, it looked as though 
Turkey had finally entered, seemingly irreversibly, on a road towards democratic con-
solidation. Both internal developments in the country and its accession process to the 
EU at the time pointed towards a future for a democratic Turkey closely integrated 
into the European order. However, in 2015 we are witnessing a different outcome: a 
stalled negotiation process with dim prospects for Turkey’s accession to the EU, and a 
backsliding into authoritarianism in the country.5 
1  ‘Turkey Media Arrests: Mogherini Leads the EU Criticism’, BBC News, 14 December 2014. Avail-
able at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30471996 (accessed 7 October 2015).
2  ‘Erdoğan Says EU Cannot Teach Turkey Democracy’, Today’s Zaman, 17 December 2014. Available 
at http://www.todayszaman.com/national_erdogan-says-eu-cannot-teach-turkey-democracy_367282.
html (accessed 7 October 2015).
3  Terrence McCoy, ‘Turkey Bans Twitter and Twitter Explodes’, Washington Post, 21 March 2014. 
Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/21/turkey-bans-twitter-
and-twitter-explodes/?tid=hp_mm (accessed 7 October 2015).
4  Meltem Müftüler-Baç, ‘Turkey’s Political Reforms: The Impact of the European Union’, Southeast 
European Politics and Societies 10 (2005), pp. 16–30.
5  For further information, see Meltem Müftüler-Baç and E. Fuat Keyman, ‘The Era of Dominant 
Party Politics’, Journal of Democracy 23 (2012), pp. 85–99, and E. Fuat Keyman, Turkey’s Transformation 
and Democratic Consolidation (London, 2013).
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This prompts the following question: does the EU’s political conditionality have unex-
pected consequences for democratic consolidation in a country such as Turkey?
The EU’s political conditionality is seen as an important factor in inducing politi-
cal change in the acceding countries.6 The Treaty on European Union is clear that 
democracy is a sine qua non for EU accession and that democratic principles and funda-
mental rights are a precondition for membership, as: ‘These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’7 Lavenex and Schimmelfen-
nig explore the EU’s role in promoting these values and democratic principles in its 
external environment, the ‘extension of [the EU’s] internal rules and policies beyond 
formal membership’,8 combined with an ability to transform a non-member country’s 
implementation of European values. This is precisely why Turkey’s backsliding into 
authoritarianism is important in order to assess the limits of political conditionality.
The key questions that emerge in this context are as follows: first, how would one assess 
the impact that a policy instrument such as the EU’s political conditionality has on 
Turkey’s democracy? Second, are the suboptimal outcomes of political conditionality 
unintended consequences? And third, for political conditionality to work, are there other 
internal preconditions in the acceding/candidate states that need to be evaluated as 
preconditions themselves? This paper evaluates these questions through the specific 
experience of Turkey’s process of democratisation, in particular with regard to its 
backsliding into a political system of authoritarian majoritarianism.
Backsliding into Authoritarianism
The Turkish–EU relationship has become an increasingly troubled one. First and fore-
most, Turkey is an uneasy fit with Europe, given its identity as a liminal country, seen 
neither as an integral part of Europe, nor as completely outside it. This liminal state, 
neither in nor out, has complicated Turkey’s relations with the European countries,9 as 
well as its incorporation into the European order as an equal partner. Second, the EU 
has been an effective player in Turkish political changes in line with the premises of the 
political conditionality literature,10 which more or less agrees on the positive aspects of 
6  Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neigh-
bourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange’, European 
Union Politics 9 (2008), pp. 187–215.
7 Treaty on European Union, Article 2. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT (accessed 7 October 2015). 
8  Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External 
Governance in European Politics’, Journal of European Public Policy 16/6 (2009), pp. 791–812 at p. 791.
9  Bahar Rumelili, ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode 
of Differentiation’, Review of International Studies 30/1 (2004), pp. 27–47.
10  For a detailed look at this literature, see Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, 
‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: Latvia, Slovakia, Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies 4 
(2003), pp. 495–518, and Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion’.
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the EU’s transformative power.11 Yet the Turkish case might provide the first major fal-
sification of these theoretical insights, through the backlash of anti-democratic forces 
and the increasing drift into authoritarianism since 2011. This would be particularly 
important for an understanding of the extent to which the EU’s transformative power 
could work, especially in order to assess the EU’s possible impact on the democratic 
transformation under way in Middle Eastern countries and the western Balkans.
When the European Commission evaluated Turkey’s ability to meet the political 
aspects of the Copenhagen criteria in 2004, it concluded that ‘Turkey sufficiently fulfils 
the Copenhagen political criteria’.12 This fitted well with the Turkish government’s 
objectives, as they had prioritised EU accession since 2002 with extensive political and 
legal reforms. The newly elected government in 2002, under Erdoğan’s rule, firmly 
declared its commitment to democracy and saw the EU accession process as a tool with 
which to transform Turkey into a democratic country. This is illustrated by Erdoğan’s 
declaration in 2002: ‘We are meeting the Copenhagen criteria to elevate the living 
standards of our people. That is our real aim’.13 As a result, Turkey seemed on the 
road to democratic consolidation, with multiple reforms adopted swiftly as negotia-
tions unfolded. However, especially since 2011, democratic consolidation in Turkey 
has taken a nosedive, with the country’s rankings in democracy, rule of law and the 
rights and freedom indexes declining steadily. For example, in the Reporters Without 
Borders’ rankings for freedom of the press, while Turkey was 98th out of 180 countries 
in 2005, it slid down to 154th out of 180 in 2014, with a small upward movement to 
149th in 2015.14 Similarly, the Freedom House report on Turkey for 2014 still listed 
the country as partly free, with three and a half out of seven for freedom ranking, four 
out of seven for civil liberties and three out of seven for political rights, while its press 
ranked as not free.15 In freedom ranking, civil liberties and press freedom, Freedom 
House detects a downward trend in Turkey since 2011.
11  Tanja Börzel and Didem Soyaltin, ‘Europeanisation in Turkey. Stretching a concept to its limits?’, 
KFG Working Papers No. 36, Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe”, Berlin: Freie 
Universität Berlin, 2012.
12  European Commission, ‘Communication of 6 October 2004 from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession [COM(2004) 656 final – Not published in the Official Journal]’. Available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:e50015 (accessed 7 October 2015). 
13  “Turkey rejects 2005 for EU Accession talks”, BBC news, December 6, 2002. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/2549909.stm (accessed 12 October 2015).
14  Reporters Without Borders, 2015 World Press Freedom Index. Available at https://index.rsf.org/#!/
index-details/TUR (accessed 7 October 2015).
15  Freedom House, ‘Turkey: Freedom in the World 2014’. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0#.VKr8XnvQN2A (accessed 7 October 2015).
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Figure 1. Freedom House Rankings for Turkey, 1998–201416
Figure 1 shows that between 1998, when the first Freedom House progress reports 
were prepared for Turkey, and 2005, when accession negotiations began, Turkey’s 
political rights and civil liberties improved, and with the onset of negotiations, they 
stabilised at round three out of seven; yet there was a decline later. Civil liberties 
worsened after 2008, sliding further down after 2013, and even though Turkey always 
remained in the partly free category, political rights too show a marked deterioration. 
These results resonate with the Economist Intelligence Unit’s evaluation of democratic 
credentials, shown in Figure 2. According to this index, Turkey’s level of democratic 
development remained the same as that of eastern European countries until 2011, but 
then began to diverge.
These rankings illustrate that Turkey’s democratisation stalled and then began to 
revert to its starting point of the 1990s. The EU’s institutions were vocal in their joint 
criticism of the backsliding into authoritarianism in Turkish politics. For example, 
the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on 15 January 2015, in response 
to the journalists’ arrests, which stated that ‘A free and pluralistic press is an essential 
component of any democracy’, and called on Turkey to
provide ample and transparent information on the allegations against the de-
fendants, to grant the defendants full access to the incriminating evidence and 
full defense rights, and to ensure the proper handling of the cases to establish 
the veracity of the accusations without delay and beyond reasonable doubt.17
16  In Freedom House rankings, 7 is the worst ranking. 
17 Güven Özalp, ‘European Parliament Accepts Resolution on Freedom of Expression in 
Turkey’, Hürriyet Daily News, 15 January 2015. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
european-parliament-accepts-resolution-on-freedom-of-expression-in-turkey-.aspx?Page-
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Figure 2. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for Turkey, Western Europe 
and Eastern Europe, 2005–13 
The discomfort in the EP about Turkey’s backsliding into authoritarianism is import-
ant, as the EP frames the political discussion around Turkey, and has the final say on 
the Turkish accession treaty. In the EP debate on Turkey in March 2014, a German 
MEP, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, declared: ‘There are more journalists in jail in 
Turkey than in China or Iran and now the Prime Minister wants to close down You-
Tube and Twitter because people are saying things he doesn’t like’,18 reflecting the 
general view in the EP, as most of the resolutions adopted there criticising the Turkish 
backsliding had around 470 MEPs’ approval.
This is an unexpected result for a country negotiating for accession, as all other 
countries that have negotiated and become members of the EU, especially in eastern 
Europe, seem to have been relatively political committed and to have stayed on the 
course of democratic consolidation.19 Yet this does not seem to be the case for the 
Turkish experience. As a result, in an unprecedented fashion, Turkey is perceived as a 
candidate country that is increasingly moving away from the EU’s political norms while 
it is paradoxically negotiating for accession to the EU. So what might be the key factors 
that set Turkey apart from other countries negotiating for accession?
18 Magda Fahsi, ‘European Parliament Uneasy about Turkey’s EU Bid, Citing Corruption and 
Internal Strife’, MintPress News, 18 March 2014. Available at http://www.mintpressnews.com/europe-
an-parliament-uneasy-about-turkeys-eu-bid-citing-corruption-and-internal-strife/186810 (accessed 7 
October 2015).
19  Tanka A. Börzel, ‘Coming Together or Drifting Apart? Political Change in New Member States, 
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Turkey’s Own Democratic Dilemmas
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power in 2002, it 
received around 36 per cent of the national vote. In the next two general elections, the 
AKP vote steadily increased, and in the 2011 elections, close to 50 per cent of the vote 
was for the AKP. Its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, became the first publicly elected 
president in August 2014, again with around 50 per cent of the popular vote. The elec-
toral performance of the AKP enabled it to become the first party in Turkish politics 
from 2002, and its hold over the country’s political development has been described 
as a ‘dominant party politics’20 and ‘majoritarian authoritarianism’.21 The AKP’s ‘elec-
toral hegemony’22 increasingly enabled it to adopt legal changes and measures that were 
detrimental to democratic consolidation. What began as a journey into democratic con-
solidation in 2002 in Turkey seemingly ended up with another type of authoritarianism.
The major ailment acting as an obstacle to democratic consolidation in the country 
could be seen as the lack of systemic checks and balances in the political structure. Spe-
cifically, the absence of a credible and organised opposition, and inherent structural 
deficiencies such as the lack of a clear separation of powers between the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary, turned out to be the key factors in the backsliding into 
authoritarianism in Turkey. These factors were coupled with the control of state insti-
tutions such as the judicial organs by the political elite, in this case the ruling party. To 
see a specific example of this control, one could look at the changes adopted since the 
beginning of 2014 in the independence of the judiciary. As a result of legal changes 
since 2013, political control of the key judicial institutions – the courts, the Council of 
State (Danıştay), the Supreme Council (Yargıtay) and finally the Constitutional Court 
(Anayasa Mahkemesi) – was increased. In all of these institutions, the government 
stepped in, influencing the selection of members as well as the rulings and decisions. 
As a result, the independence of the judiciary – a key principle in democracies – was 
clearly violated. For example, the increased political control of judicial institutions led 
to a declaration in January 2014 by the Speaker for the Turkish Parliament, Cemil 
Çiçek of the ruling AKP, that: ‘Article 138 of the Constitution is not functioning … 
Article 138 of the Constitution is dead in this country.’23 Since this particular Article 
guarantees the independence of the judiciary in Turkey and guards the principle of 
the separation of powers, Çiçek was basically warning that the government was in con-
trol of the judiciary along with the executive and the legislature.
20  Keyman, Turkey’s Transformation.
21  Ergun Özbudun, ‘The AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift’, South European Society 
and Politics 19 (2014), pp. 155–67.
22  Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, ‘Era of Dominant Party Politics’.
23 Serkan Demirtaş, ‘Turkish Parliamentary Speaker Çiçek Deplores End of Court 
Independence’, Hürriyet Daily News, 4 January 2014. Available at http://www.hurriyetda-
ilynews.com/turkish-parliamentary-speaker-cicek-deplores-end-of-court-independence.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=60549&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 7 October 2015).
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When one looks at the legal changes adopted throughout 2013 and 2014, it seems 
as though Çiçek’s warning is to the point. In 2014, a reform package was adopted 
for the selection of judges and prosecutors for the Supreme Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK). The EU has been most vocal about the selection process as being 
too politically driven and controlled. Some changes had already been adopted on 12 
September 2010 through a constitutional amendment after a referendum. Nonethe-
less, the presiding role of the justice minister over the HSYK has remained, blurring 
the separation of the judiciary from elected government officials, that is, the execu-
tive. With a new legal change adopted in June 2014, the government’s control over 
the HSYK and the minister of justice’s powers over the institution were increased. 
Similarly, with the legal decrees adopted throughout 2014, executive powers over the 
four key judicial institutions listed above were enhanced. The independence of the 
judiciary is one of the most important elements of democratic consolidation, since it 
acts as part of a system of checks and balances on elected officials. Yet the perception 
of such a judicial oversight of elected officials in Turkey is one of ‘judicial control’ and 
a curtailment of the powers of elected officials – the key representatives of democracy 
in the country. This brings us to the diverging perceptions of democracy in Turkey 
and in the EU.
Turkish politicians emphasise democracy as a manifestation of popular will through 
electoral results, a key argument being that as long as a political party is elected to 
power by a majority of the voters, it has the prerogative to rule as it sees fit. It is, of 
course, beyond doubt that voters have the ultimate say in politics, but to disregard 
other institutions and the separation of powers is detrimental to democratic consolida-
tion. This view was summarised by Kalaycıoğlu as follows:
Since the 20th century, all regimes in the world – except a few rentier monar-
chies such as Saudi Arabia – are populist regimes widely backed by the masses; 
they operate with the mass mobilization of the people. This implies that an 
understanding of democracy based on ballot box results is no longer a valid 
argument to consider a regime as ‘democratic’ or legitimately hold on to polit-
ical power through the crystallization of the popular will.24
This is precisely why systemic deficiencies in checks and balances become an important 
element in a democratisation process. If there are no credible controls over elected 
officials, no matter how strong their electoral support is, that political system cannot 
be seen as a democracy. It might be this divergence in defining what democracy means 
between Turkey and the EU that lies at the heart of the problem.
24  Gülten Üstüntağ, ‘AK Party Turns to Be a Major Obstacle Before Democracy in Turkey’, Today’s 
Zaman, 8 November 2014. Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/national_ak-party-turns-to-be-
a-major-obstacle-before-democracy-in-turkey_363867.html (accessed 7 October 2015).
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Conclusion
Turkey’s backsliding into authoritarianism since 2011 is perplexing given its place 
in the EU’s enlargement process. Despite the many obligations the country had as a 
candidate for the EU, it diverted from the route of democratic consolidation and was 
increasingly labelled as a prime example of majoritarian authoritarianism. Whether it 
was the lack of the EU’s credibility as an anchor for Turkey or the domestic forces at 
play in the country that led to this situation is yet to be analysed. However, the Turkish 
experience since 2011, in which individual rights and liberties are compromised and 
the basic pillars of liberal democracy, such as the independence of the judiciary, are 
shaken, indicates a reversal of the political reforms under way since 2002. This paper 
has argued that it is the systemic deficiencies in Turkish politics, where effective checks 
and balances are missing, or have been eliminated to consolidate political power in 
one grasp, could be seen as the main structural factor in holding democratic consol-
idation in Turkey down. This is a paradoxical outcome for EU conditionality on the 
one hand, and for the democratisation literature on the other hand. The question that 
remains open is as follows: could the Turkish experience of democratisation slowly 
leading to an illiberal democracy highlight some of the theoretical loopholes of the 
political conditionality literature?
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Introduction
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, reforms in the 
security sector, and especially in civil–military relations, have been a priority. In this 
period of more than a decade, the powers, autonomy and functions of key institutions in 
the security sector have been redefined, with legal amendments and major changes in the 
behavioural patterns of actors. Some of the reforms in the area of civil–military relations 
brought the Turkish legal structure close to being an ideal-type democracy. However, 
an overall assessment of these changes, not only in civil–military relations but also in the 
police and intelligence, clearly shows that they have not resulted in democratisation.
First, the political decision to control the military, and the judicial proceedings aimed 
at deterring and punishing interventionist military personnel, have occurred accord-
ing to subjective criteria and with politically charged motivations. Even though the 
end result of these processes seems to be positive, the means of achieving them have 
obliterated the rule of law, and hence the basic principles of democracy. Second, the 
manner in which political actors control the police and intelligence also demonstrates 
that the guiding motivation is not democratisation but creating loyal security services. 
The most recent internal security law passed in parliament gives unprecedented power 
to the police, raising concerns over basic principles of human rights, freedom of speech 
and of association. Altogether, developments in the security sector draw a bleak picture 
and, despite some gains in the area of civil–military relations, they demonstrate the 
continuation of undemocratic practices, especially in the area of police and intelligence.
Democratic Achievements in the Area of Civil–Military Relations
The constitutional and legal reforms in civil–military relations have covered a wide 
range of areas since the early 2000s. The tutelary powers of the armed forces over 
elected politicians have been severely restricted by several amendments to the 1982 
Constitution, the Law of the National Security Council (NSC) and other laws and reg-
ulations. With these reforms, the NSC lost its dominant role in the security sector 
and its tutelage over civilians. The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to inter-
vene against internal threats was abolished and the task of the TAF became primarily 
defence against foreign enemies. Moreover, civilian oversight of the military budget 
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through the Court of Auditors was guaranteed, and the military courts’ jurisdiction was 
restricted so that they could not try civilians and military personnel if they committed 
general crimes.
Besides these legal reforms, important changes also took place in practice. The High 
Military Council meetings, which decide on personnel appointments and promotions, 
began to be chaired by the prime minister in 2011. Accordingly, from August 2010 the 
government had played a more active role in personnel decisions, even causing the 
chief of staff to resign over a possible disagreement with civilians before the August 2011 
meeting. Another significant change in practice has been in the procedures that were 
followed in the preparation of the National Security Policy Document (NSPD). In the 
past, the military bureaucracy of the NSC had been responsible for this document and 
identifying internal and external threats. In 2010, for the first time, civilians took charge 
of authoring the NSPD, limiting another of the tutelary powers of the armed forces.1
While the significance of reforms in civil–military relations should not be underesti-
mated, it cannot be claimed that civilian control over the military is complete. As of 
February 2015, for instance, the military is responsible to the prime minister, not the 
Ministry of National Defence, and parliament does not debate the military budget in 
detail (even though it has the legal right to do so). Despite these shortcomings, how-
ever, in important respects Turkish civil–military relations have come close to being 
those of a democracy, and the era of military interventions in politics has come to an 
end for the foreseeable future.
Politicisation of Court Cases against Military Officers and the 
Annihilation of the Rule of Law
Critical in civil–military relations after 2007 were the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledge-
hammer) investigations. In these court cases, around 600 retired and active-duty 
military officers and civilians were accused of planning to stage coups against the AKP 
in the early years of its rule. In 2012 and 2013, after several years of investigations and 
trials, the Specially Authorised Courts that tried the cases decided that the majority 
of the suspects were guilty and condemned hundreds of people to various years in 
prison. Among those that received life sentences were a former chief of the General 
Staff and commanders of the armed forces. This was an exceptional and highly sym-
bolic outcome of the trials in a country that has witnessed two military coups d’état 
(1960, 1980) and two military interventions that forced the governments of the day 
out of power (1971, 1997). Arguably, one of the political consequences of the cases was 
to advance the continuing democratisation process by cleansing the military of coup 
plotters, strengthening the hands of civilians in reforming civil–military relations and 
reshaping the public’s attitudes towards the military.
1  For more information on these amendments see Yaprak Gürsoy, Türkiye’de Sivil-Asker İlişkilerinin 
Dönüşümü (Istanbul,, 2013), and ‘From Tutelary Powers and Interventions to Civilian Control: An 
Overview of Turkish Civil–Military Relations since the 1920s’, in Carmen Rodriguez, Antonio Avalos, 
Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet (eds), Turkey’s Democratization Process (London and New York, 2013), 
pp. 253–73.
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However, from the very beginning, the investigations were criticised for being polit-
ical and obliterating the rule of law. Suspected individuals were kept in custody for 
days without any formal charges, prominent individuals with severe health problems 
were detained in unacceptable conditions, and well-known journalists and civil society 
activists (some of them quite outspoken in their opposition to coups) were accused 
of being part of a clandestine organisation. Most of those who had been implicated, 
including civilians, had been linked together as members of a terrorist organisation, 
although they were from very different backgrounds with no apparent connections. 
The evidence that had been used in the indictments was also widely suspected of being 
forged. Especially in the Balyoz case, some of the evidence against the accused was 
later proven to be completely fictitious.2
Later events also demonstrated that the coup investigations were carried out by public 
prosecutors who were allegedly part of the movement led by Fethullah Gülen. At the 
beginning of the AKP’s rule, the Gülen movement and the AKP were implicitly allied 
and worked together in several key areas.3 A moderate and modern preacher as well 
as an opinion leader, Gülen has millions of followers inside and outside Turkey. The 
movement funds schools all over the world, and has connections with the media, busi-
nessmen and civil society organisations. Gülen was a resident of Turkey, but in 2000 
he was accused of covertly attempting to bring down the state, leading him to remain 
permanently in Pennsylvania, USA, where he already resided due to health problems.4 
Although President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not linked with the movement, in the 
initial years the party was encouraged by its media and business network. In return, it 
is believed that Gülen’s followers were allowed by the AKP to increase their influence 
in state organs, especially in the judiciary and police.
Since 2011, the AKP’s relations with the Gülen movement have shattered. The two 
forces were united initially in their mutual disdain for the military. However, as time 
went on it became clear that on several issues, such as Turkey’s tactics in the Middle 
East and the solution to the Kurdish issue, Erdoğan and Gülen were on opposite 
pages.5 In the winter of 2013, the AKP attempted to close down supplementary schools 
in order to deprive the Gülen movement of its core base in these facilities. In response, 
on 17 December 2013 alleged Gülen prosecutors began a corruption investigation that 
implicated government ministers. The next month, the prosecutor’s office stopped 
trucks supposedly carrying arms to the Syrian rebels. The gendarmerie (which func-
tions as a police force in rural areas) and the prosecutor’s office wanted to search the 
trucks, but the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MİT) did not allow it. The raid 
on the trucks and the corruption investigations were perceived as attacks against the 
government by the Gülen movement. After the corruption investigation, government 
2  For political consequences of the Ergenekon investigation see Yaprak Gürsoy, ‘The Changing 
Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?’, Democratization 19/4 
(August 2012), pp. 735–60, and ‘Turkish Public Opinion on the Coup Allegations: Implications for 
Democratization’, Political Science Quarterly 130/1 (Spring 2015), pp. 103–32.
3  Berna Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement (Stanford, 2006).
4  Joshua D. Hendrick, Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York 
and London, 2013).
5  Ruşen Çakır and Semih Sakallı, 100 Soruda Erdoğan X Gülen Savaşı (Istanbul, 2014).
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ministers were changed, and since then, there have been attempts to cleanse the police 
and judiciary of suspected Gülen supporters.
After the rift between the Gülenists and the AKP, the decisions of the court cases 
against the military were overturned. In June 2014, the Constitutional Court reversed 
the Balyoz decision and all of the accused were released from prison. The Court of 
Appeals also overturned the verdicts and the case was retried, leading to the acquittal 
of all suspects in April 2015. Similarly, in March 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the rights of a number of Ergenekon suspects had been violated, and released 
suspects from prison. This verdict was based on the fact that the first instance court, 
which sentenced suspects in August 2013, did not write its detailed ruling for almost a 
year. Furthermore, the Specially Authorised Courts which tried the cases were closed 
down, and the detention periods had been reduced by previous reforms. The Specially 
Authorised Courts were considered as a Gülen stronghold. The fact that the cases 
against the military officers were tried in these courts was perceived as evidence that 
the Gülenists were behind the investigations and the cases. But now, by closing down 
the courts, the government was depriving the movement of its base in the judiciary. 
For the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases in particular, the decision to free convicted people 
in 2013, but not earlier, when many observers were pointing to the irregularities, had 
demonstrated the political nature of the matter from the very beginning; only now the 
government had switched sides, supporting the rights of the military officers against 
the Gülen movement. The involvement of politics in a matter of law shows that the 
military had come under civilian control through a process that damaged democracy 
rather than protecting it.
New Laws Regarding the Intelligence and Police
The showdown between the public prosecutor and the MİT in the searching of the 
trucks heading for Syria in January 2014 was only one of the incidents that brought 
the Gülen movement and the MİT up against each other, and proved that the intel-
ligence service had become a loyal security service of the AKP government in general 
and President Erdoğan in particular. It was reported in the foreign press that the 
chief of the MİT, Hakan Fidan, who used to be Erdoğan’s private advisor, was taking 
independent action in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings and continuing to 
function as Erdoğan’s primary aide in foreign policy.6 At home, Fidan’s activities drew 
attention when, in September 2011, voice records were revealed of him and a MİT 
official meeting with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leaders in Oslo almost two years 
earlier. Subsequently, in February 2012, the prosecutor responsible for investigating 
the activities of the alleged urban wing of the PKK, the Kurdistan Communities Union 
(KCK), called Fidan and other MİT members to testify in the case. 
6  Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, ‘Turkey’s Spymaster Plots Own Course on Syria’, Wall Street 
Journal, 10 October 2013. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036433045
79107373585228330 (accessed 19 February 2015). David Ignatius, ‘Turkey Blows Israel’s Cover for 
Iranian Spy Ring’, Washington Post, 17 October 2013. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/david-ignatius-turkey-blows-israels-cover-for-iranian-spy-ring/2013/10/16/7d9c1eb2-3686-
11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html (accessed 19 February 2015).
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The AKP government initially dodged the bullet by removing the Gülenist prosecutor 
from his position and dismissing or sending to remote parts of the country thousands 
of police officers. Also, within 10 days of the prosecutor’s attempt to investigate Fidan, 
the law on the MİT was changed by parliament to require the approval of the prime 
minister to try the chief of the MİT. The new article of the law was applied retrospec-
tively to all continuing investigations, freeing Fidan from a possible trial.7 Erdoğan 
declared that the incident was an illegal attempt to bring about chaos and serve Tur-
key’s enemies. His defence demonstrated the special place that the MİT has been 
accorded in Turkish domestic and foreign policy today.
In April 2014, a new MİT law, envisioning more comprehensive changes in the agency’s 
functions, was approved by parliament in order to prevent similar incidents occurring in 
future. However, certain provisions of the law were criticised by opposition parties, human 
rights groups and other observers for creating an ‘intelligence state’ and giving extraor-
dinary powers to the agency.8 Among the articles that caused concern are the following:9
• The duties of the MİT were expanded so that the agency would be responsible for 
matters involving national defence, the fight against terrorism and national security.
• In these matters the agency can collect, analyse and record data from any individ-
ual or institution, including tapping phone calls. Those (such as journalists) who 
do not want to share information with the MİT can be tried and receive prison 
sentences of up to four years.
• No institution can use legal statutes pertaining to its own status in order to refuse 
sharing documents or information with the MİT. Yet the agency itself can keep its 
activities secret.
• Legal cases against intelligence officials can be opened by public prosecutors only 
when the institution itself decides that it is necessary. The chief of the MİT can be 
tried only if the president approves it. This article changed the 2012 law which had 
stated that the prime minister must approve the trial of the undersecretary of the 
MİT. Yet, because Prime Minister Erdoğan was elected president in August 2014, 
essentially it is still Erdoğan who decides whether the undersecretary can be tried.
• Anyone who publishes leaked information regarding MİT officials and the agency’s 
activities can receive prison sentences of up to 10 years.10
7  ‘Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair 
Kanun’, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 17 February 2012. Available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanun-
lar/k6278.html (accessed 19 February 2015).
8  ‘Turkey’s Spy Agency Granted Extraordinary Powers, as President Gül Approves MİT law’, Hürriyet 
Daily News, 25 April 2014. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-spy-agency-grant-
ed-extraordinary-powers-as-president-gul-approves-mit-law-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=65584 
(accessed 19 February 2015).
9  ‘İşte Yeni MİT Yasası’, Milliyet, 17 April 2014. Available at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/iste-yeni-mit-
yasasi/gundem/detay/1868696/default.htm (accessed 19 February 2015).
10  For the details of the new law see ‘Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Taşkilatı Kanunda 
Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun’, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 14 April 2014. Available at http://
www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6532.html (accessed 18 April 2014). 
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The new law suggests that in national security matters, the MİT has replaced the pre-
vious role of the military. Just as the NSC used to have a large range of duties, now the 
intelligence agency is responsible for security and defence matters broadly defined. 
Similarly, as the NSC used to have unprecedented powers over other state institutions, 
obliging them to share information and documents, the MİT now presides over all 
security activities in a manner that dominates other institutions. Despite similarities, 
however, there is an important difference between the NSC and the MİT pertaining to 
their relations with the current government. Although the military worked with certain 
political parties and governments more in tandem than others, relations with the last 
government were obviously not harmonious. This situation is reversed in the case of 
the MİT. The intelligence agency, now equipped with new powers and immunities, 
works in accord with the AKP government.
Another institution that the government is trying to bring under its control is the 
police. From the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the laws that guided the author-
ity and functions of the police prioritised state security over individual rights and 
freedoms. Over the years, the powers of the police were expanded to control citizens 
and prevent opposition to the state ideology, in the name of public order. Although a 
few democratic steps were taken at the beginning of the 2000s to limit the powers of 
the police, overall during the AKP era the basic tenets of the body of legislation did not 
change.11 More recently, with the rift between the Gülen movement and the AKP, the 
government has tried to bring the police under its direct control by dismissing officers 
perceived to be in opposition.
In March 2015, parliament passed a new internal security package, with the intention 
of strengthening the hands of the law enforcement agencies. The gendarmerie came 
more under the authority of the Ministry of Interior rather than the military. Although 
this might be seen as a positive development from the perspective of civil–military 
relations, the fact that governors would be able to oversee and determine the promo-
tion and appointment of gendarmerie personnel suggests that the forces are ‘likely to 
be used as another tool for the government to suppress the opposition’.12 Moreover, 
more endemic problems with regards to the gendarmerie, such as its wide-ranging 
policing and military functions, as well as its responsibilities to more than one author-
ity (military, national and local government and judiciary), still continue. According 
to the opposition in parliament, the articles of the law package on the gendarmerie 
were enacted in order to prevent the forces being used by the judiciary for a possible 
attack against the interests of the government, as happened during the search of the 
MİT trucks in 2014.13
11  Zeynep Gönen, Zeynep Başer, Mehmet Uçum and Biriz Berksoy, The Spirit of the Police Laws in 
Turkey: Legislative Discourses, Instruments and Mentality (Istanbul, 2013).
12  Lale Kemal, ‘Internal Security Package and Gendermerie’, Today’s Zaman, 29 January 2015. 
Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal/internal-security-package-and-gen-
darmerie_371135.html (accessed 18 April 2015).
13  Çiğdem Toker, ‘İç Güvenlik Paketi ve “Jandarma” Rahatsızlığı’, Cumhuriyet, 11 February 2015. 
Available at http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/211263/ic_Guvenlik_Paketi_ve__Jandarma__
Rahatsizligi.html (accessed 18 April 2015).
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Another set of articles in the package changed the laws on the duties and authorities 
of the police, raising serious concerns over basic democratic rights of taking part in 
peaceful organisations or of the freedom of speech. Some of the controversial articles 
in the law are the following:14
• It would be possible for the police to search people and vehicles without a warrant.
• The police could use firearms when they suspect that an assailant is going to attack 
even when she or he does not possess a lethal weapon.
• In public meetings, demonstrations and rallies, those who possess slingshots and 
marbles, cover their faces, and wear clothes, carry banners or shout slogans that 
belong to or are similar to those of illegal organisations would face prison sentenc-
es ranging from several months to five years.
• The police would be able to use dyed water in dispersing protesting crowds.
• It would become possible to detain individuals for 24 hours in cases of crimes 
committed alone, and protestors for 48 hours in cases involving mass incidents, 
without the authorisation of a prosecutor.
• The governor, who is appointed by the government, would be able to give direct 
orders to the police.15
These provisions give unusual powers to the police in order to prevent any public 
protest, rally or demonstration. The government argues that the articles in the law are 
similar to regulations in some EU countries and do not pose any threat to democracy. 
Although it is possible to find analogous clauses in EU countries’ laws, it is the overall 
package that raises concerns, not single items that are similar to other countries’ prac-
tices. Since the Turkish police is known to violate human rights, the new law does not 
give any optimism that it will use its authority in a manner that protects individuals.16 
Quite to the contrary, if the government succeeds in fully controlling the police and 
the gendarmerie, these forces would repress dissent and opposition demonstrations 
even when they are entirely peaceful.
14  ‘İç Güvenlik Paketi’nde öne çıkan maddeler’, BBC, 3 February 2015. Available at http://www.bbc.
co.uk/turkce/haberler/2015/02/150203_tasari_basliklar (accessed 19 February 2015). Human Rights 
Watch, ‘Turkey: Security Bill Undermines Rights’, Human Rights Watch, 11 December 2014. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/11/turkey-security-bill-undermines-rights (accessed 18 April 2015).
15  For the full articles of the law, see ‘Polis Vazife ve Salâhiyet Kanunu, Jandarma Teşkilat, Görev 
ve Yetkileri Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun’, Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi, 27 March 2015. Available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6638.html (accessed 18 April 
2015).
16  Emma Sinclair-Webb, ‘Is Turkey Just Copying the EU in Increasing Police Powers?’, Hürriyet 
Daily News, 14 February 2015. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/is-turkey-just-copying-
the-eu-in-increasing-police-powers-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=78328&NewsCatID=396 (accessed 18 
April 2014). 
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Conclusion
When it comes to the matter of security sector reform, the record of the AKP govern-
ment is mixed. Although in civil–military relations important democratic steps have 
been taken, the reform packages involving the intelligence agency and the police sug-
gest that the main goal of the government has not necessarily been democratisation. 
The government demolished the tutelage of the military, which ideologically stood 
against the AKP and threatened to curb the powers of the elected parliament and the 
government. The legal changes that took place in this regard were important for the 
further democratisation of the country. However, when it came to the trial of suspected 
coup plotters, the government collaborated with members of the Gülen movement in 
the judiciary, leading to a situation where possibly innocent people were denied due 
process and imprisoned for years simply because they had opposed the government 
and the Gülen movement. Then, when the AKP and the Gülenists parted company, 
the government switched sides, facilitating the release from prison of all Ergenkon and 
Balyoz suspects. The politicisation of those court cases from their inception in 2007 
until today obliterated the rule of law, damaging democracy.
The AKP government’s approach to the security sector indicates that the main goal 
is creating loyal services. The tutelage of the military was eradicated, serving this 
purpose. The government’s close relations with the MİT and its infringement of the 
internal affairs of the police, as well as the new laws passed by the government, point 
in the same direction. With a trustworthy group of security forces, all opposition to the 
AKP – whether from Kemalist, Gülenist, Kurdish or liberal origins – would be limited 
in its ability to express its disagreements and criticisms freely.
Endemic problems with the MİT and police, such as the failure of oversight by elected 
officials and the judiciary, have not been created during the AKP era.17 The disregard 
for individual rights, the prioritisation of public order, the treatment of citizens as 
potential criminals, the broad definition of national security, the use of torture and 
unnecessary force, and the lack of transparency in security activities by all segments 
of the security sector, including the military, intelligence and the police, were inher-
ited from the past. The fact that some headway was made with regard to civil–military 
relations does not change the outcome: the government since 2002 has done little 
to overcome these problems in other security sector institutions and, in the past few 
years, has added more undemocratic legislation and practices to the list.
17  Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and the Needs for 
Reform (Istanbul, 2013).
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